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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari requests this Court to
review the following questions:
1.

Did the Court of Appeals have the authority to modify

the temporary alimony award of the trial court and award
permanent alimony instead?
2.

Was the Court of Appeals' decision in awarding

permanent alimony supported by the facts, and the law in the
State of Utah.
REPORT OF THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at Thronson
v. Thronson, 157 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah Ct. App. March 25, 1991)
[hereinafter Thronson], and is appended hereto as Exhibit 1.

STATEMENT OF GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS BASED
The Petition of the Defendant/Appellee is based upon the
provisions of § 78-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) and Rule
45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Rule 46 of the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure sets forth the considerations
governing the review of certiorari. The Petition has failed to
specifically identify the consideration(s) which require this
Court to grant the Petition.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
1.

Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

2.

Olsen v. Olsen. 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985).

3.

Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),

cert. granted, Sept. 7, 1988.
4.

English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977).

In addition, the other case law set forth hereafter is
determinative in the issues raised in the Petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

The parties were married for ten years and nine months.

2.

The parties have one son of this marriage, Patrick, age

3.

Ms. Thronson, while a pharmacist, interrupted her

nine.

career and its development to become the primary care-taker of
the child and worked part-time for that reason during the
marriage.

(T.R. 172 - 174)
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4.

That during the pendency of the divorce, Ms. Thronson

was required to utilize her savings and inheritance to meet her
monthly living expenses. (T.R. 257, 295)

Furthermore, Ms.

Thronson was required to incur debts in order to finance her
minimal living expenses during this period of time. (T.R. 333)
5.

At the time of the trial Ms. Thronson was employed

part-time at 16 hours a week earning $15.50 per hour. (T.R. 173,
217-218)

During the pendency of the action and prior to trial

Ms. Thronson received temporary child support of $1,000 per month
and temporary alimony of $1,000 per month plus one of the
annuities.

(T.R. 139 and Defendant's Exhibit 38 admitted at T.R.

553)
6.

The annuity which was awarded to Ms. Thronson in the

amount of $989.45 per month will expire and terminate on December
15, 1991. Additionally, the Defendant was awarded the other
annuity of the parties paying $1,004.50 per month which expired
in March of 1991. (Defendant's Exhibit 38 admitted at T.R. 553)
7.

At the time of the trial Mr. Thronson was a practicing

attorney earning income of $94,476 per year with expenses of
$4,003 per month. (Opinion of the Court of Appeals, p. 13).
9.

Ms. Thronson had monthly expenses at the time of the

trial of $3,700 per month. (Opinion of the Court of Appeals, p.
13) .
10.

Ms. Thronson has the ability to earn $35,000 per year

when working full-time thus leaving an annual deficit between her

-3-

ability to produce income for herself, and the needs as found by
the trial court of $9,400 annually. (Opinion of the Court of
Appeals, p. 13).
11.

Throughout these proceedings Ms. Thronson has stated a

claim for permanent alimony and equitable restitution
(Appellants Reply Brief at p. 12, T.R. 350, 352).
12.

In the Complaint for divorce Ms. Thronson requested

permanent alimony of $2,000 per month, together with "such other
and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper."
(See Complaint for Divorce, Exhibit 2)
13.

Mr. Thronson petitioned the Court of Appeals for

rehearing alleging, principally, that the Court of Appeals had
misunderstood the trial court's ruling and finding of gross
monthly income on the part of Ms. Thronson.

The Court of Appeals

denied the Petition for Rehearing on May 21, 1991.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MR, THRONSON HAS NOT MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF
RULE 46 FOR THE GRANTING OF THE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIORARI,
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides in
part:
Review by a Writ of Certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of judicial discretion,
and will be granted only for special and
important reasons, (emphasis added)
Rule 46, Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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The Rule goes on to spell out the four important reasons
that the Supreme Court may consider in passing on a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals on the same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law in
a way that is in conflict with the decision
of the Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned
such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power
of supervision; or,
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state or
federal law which has not, but should be,
settled by the Supreme Court.
Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
It is important to note that the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari has failed to specify what consideration it claims
should be relied upon by this Court in granting the Petition.
However, the Petition would appear to qualify or to state grounds
only under Rule 46(c) claiming, apparently, that the decision of
the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings so as to call for review.
As will be demonstrated, the Court of Appeals' decision is
consistent with established Utah law both as to its authority to
award permanent alimony, and as to the equity of that decision.

-5-

For these reasons, the requirements of Rule 46 are not met
and this Court must deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS AUTHORITY TO MODIFY
A LOWER COURT DECISION AND GRANT PERMANENT
ALIMONY IN THIS CASE,
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari seems to claim that not
only is permanent alimony unjustified given the facts of this
case, but that the Court of Appeals could not have awarded
permanent alimony for:
(1)

Want of authority; and,

(2)

Failure to raise the issue below.

This court modified the trial court's award of temporary
alimony and awarded permanent alimony instead in Olsen v. Olsen,
704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985):
Therefore, under our discretionary power to
modify the final Decree in a divorce action,
we hereby modify the Decree of Divorce in
this case to provide for permanent alimony
from defendant to plaintiff. Again, should
the circumstance change in the future, the
defendant may petition the court to modify
the Decree under its continuing jurisdiction.
Id. at 566-567, citing Hialev v. Hialev, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983)
and Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979).
In Olsen not only did the court acknowledge the
discretionary power of appellate courts to modify a Decree of
Divorce, but also set forth the wisdom and justification for
permanent alimony awards in cases such as this.

Given, the

continuing jurisdiction of the courts over alimony awards, an
alimony award should be permanent and not anticipate changes in
-6-

circumstances which are not presently ascertainable with a high
degree of certainty.

Otherwise, an alimony award which is made

temporary may be based upon circumstances which may never occur
and are purely speculative.
In this case, there were no findings and no evidence to
support any findings that the disparity in income between Mr. and
Mrs. Thronson would ever diminish.

Likewise, there were no facts

and could be no finding that Ms. Thronson's needs or ability to
meet those needs would ever change.
However, if those circumstances were to substantially change
in the future, either party would have the right to seek a
modification of the Decree.
In Rudman v. Rudman. 16 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Utah Ct. App. May
28, 1991), the court noted:
The second error of law is that any future
social security award is too speculative,
absent a specific finding as to the date and
the amount of the future award.
Id. at 38.
In Rudman, the lower court awarded alimony until the wife
reached the age of 65 and would receive social security benefits.
There, as in this case, any reason for terminating alimony would
be too speculative.

In this case, unlike Rudman, no finding was

made at all with regard to any future circumstances which would
alleviate the need for alimony on the part of Ms. Thronson. Mr.
Thronson is protected, in any case, by his opportunity to seek a
modification if that did occur.
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In addition to permanent alimony, Ms. Thronson requested
equitable restitution, or alimony in an increased amount paid
presently and for a shorter period of time.

There are many

reasons that would justify such a request for the present use of
alimony in an increased amount rather than waiting for lower
installments paid over a longer period of time.
Secondly, the Petition suggests that the Court should not
have granted a permanent alimony award because it was not
requested below.

The Complaint of the Plaintiff specifically

asks for permanent alimony in the amount of $2,000 (See Exhibit
2).

At various times thereafter, Ms. Thronson sought various

forms of relief including alimony, alimony limited by years and
amount but increased from that awarded by the lower court or the
Court of Appeals, and equitable restitution.

The different

relief claimed at various times by Ms. Thronson was likely
dictated by tactical considerations and Ms. Thronson's own
perception of her future circumstances at any given time.

In

addition, Ms. Thronson, prayed for just and reasonable relief in
the discretion of the Court after being advised of all the facts.
It was in the exercise of that request, as well as the authority
cited above, that the Court of Appeals modified the lower court
decision and granted a permanent alimony award.
In Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
cert, granted, Sept. 7, 1988, Plaintiff raised the issue of the
adequacy of child support and alimony on appeal.
the trial court had awarded temporary alimony.
-8-

There, as here,

Relying upon

Olsen, the Court of Appeals found that the lower court had abused
its discretion in limiting the award of alimony to a period of
five years, and, instead awarded permanent alimony.

There is no

indication in Martinez that the Plaintiff sought permanent
alimony, but rather, raised only the general question of the
sufficiency of the alimony award on appeal.
POINT III
THE COURT OF APPEALS' RULING IS CONSISTENT
WITH UTAH CASE LAW,
At the heart of Mr. Thronson's Petition is his belief that,
"Alimony is now designed primarily to assist the formerly
dependent or semi-dependent spouse to achieve or re-achieve
financial self-sufficiency so as to vitiate further need for
alimony.". (Appellee's Petition for Rehearing, page 13,
Appellee's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, page 14)

Except for

a Maryland case, Mr. Thronson suggests no authority for that
notion.
Furthermore, Mr. Thronson proposes, "Most people, when they
are faced with a differential between their income and expenses,
either raise their income, through working more hours or
selecting other employment, or reduce their expenses to a level
which they are capable of paying.". (Appellee's Brief, page 14)
Mr. Thronson suggests that that principal be applied only to Ms.
Thronson and not himself.
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Mr. Thronson goes on to suggest that alimony should not be a
"lifetime pension" nor should it encourage substantial
underemployment or discourage self sufficiency.1
Nowhere in the Petition for Rehearing or Petition for Writ
of Certiorari is the real standard for the award of alimony, in
Utah, mentioned or discussed.

However, the findings of the lower

court do address the basis for determining alimony, and the Court
of Appeals decision is based upon those findings.
In Utah an alimony award should, "to the extent possible,
equalize the parties' respective standards of living and maintain
them at a level as close as possible to that standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage." Howell v. Howell, 155 Utah Adv.
Rep. 18, p. 20, (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076) (Utah
1988)).

See also, Paffell v. Paffell, 732 P.2d 96, 100-101 (Utah

1986) and Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985).

Furthermore,

"An alimony award should, to the extent possible, equalize the
parties' respective post-divorce living standards. . .",

Rasband

v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

The process for analyzing an alimony award is
straightforward and long established by case law in this state.

1

It should be remembered that the Court of Appeals
arrived at its decision to award permanent alimony after
ratifying the lower court regarding Ms. Thronson's full-time
income and inability to meet her present needs nonetheless.
Therefore, it cannot be argued that the alimony in this case will
discourage Ms. Thronson's full-time employment when it is one of
the assumptions accounted for in the award of alimony.
-10-

This Court correctly set forth the three considerations in making
an alimony award as follows:
(1)

The financial condition and needs of the party

seeking alimony;
(2)

The party's ability to produce sufficient income

for him or herself; and
(3)

The ability of the other party to provide support.

Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), (citing
English v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977))
After determining the financial needs and resources of the
parties, "the court should set alimony as permitted by those
parameters, to approximate the parties' standard of living during
the marriage as closely as possible.

It follows that if the

payor/spouses resources are adequate alimony need not be limited
to provide for only basic needs, but should also consider the
recipient's spouse's station in life."

Howell v. Howell, 155

Utah Adv. Rep. 18, at p. 20. (quoting Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d
144, 147 (Utah 1978)).
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari suggests that the Court
of Appeals' decision is not consistent with any Utah case law.
In Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988) the Supreme Court
upheld a permanent alimony award of $750 per month where the
husband had yearly income approaching $100,000 per year and the
wife was in her early 30s, in good health, well educated and
working as a full-time teacher, earning over $27,000 annually.
The permanent alimony award was sustained even though the wife
-11-

received a large cash settlement at the time of the divorce in
the amount of $164,000, as well as substantial amounts of
personal property.

The parties had been married less than 13

years.
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari attempts to minimize the
impact of the Davis case suggesting that it is an isolated case.
However, the facts of Davis, as well as the facts in this case,
meet the established criteria for the award of alimony rather
than a mythical "profile" that the Petition has created as the
basis for an alimony award.
The Petition places an extraordinary amount of weight on the
fact that these parties were married almost 11 years.

Not only

is that a sufficient time given the alimony considerations and
the process for awarding alimony described above, it is also an
inappropriate consideration.

"The standard utilized by the trial

court, viz. the length of the marriage and the contributions of
each to their joint financial success, is not an appropriate
measure to determine alimony."

English v. English, 565 P.2d 4 09

(Utah 1977).
POINT IV
THE AWARD OF PERMANENT ALIMONY IS FAIR AND
EQUITABLE.
The Petition suggests that the award of permanent alimony is
unfair because Ms. Thronson was awarded "substantial financial
support", a "substantial cash payment" and a "substantial
inheritance".

The Petition does not set forth how these items
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affect Ms. Thronson's ability to produce income for herself and
meet her needs.
Ms. Thronson was awarded one of the parties annuities paying
$989 per month.

That annuity will terminate in December, 1991.

Mr. Thronson received the other annuity paying over $1,000 per
month which likewise terminates in 1991.
Ms. Thronson received an inheritance from the estate of her
deceased brother prior to the divorce trial. However, because
her support during that period of time was insufficient the
entire inheritance amount was depleted.

(T.R. 177, 179 and 256-

257) .
The limited partnership interest awarded to Ms. Thronson and
valued at $11,000 provides no monthly cash flow.

Obviously, the

pension and IRA interests provide no present income or cash flow.
In fact, Ms. Thronson7s IRA has been Mcashed-in" to pay for her
monthly living expenses resulting from the deficiency which
occurred after alimony terminated more than a year ago. Ms.
Thronson has been forced to sell her home because she could no
longer maintain it without alimony.

The cash award to Ms.

Thronson was in the amount of $2,002 which was the cash payment
at the end of the trial from defendants stock in his law firm,
which amount has likewise been consumed to meet her monthly
living expenses after the termination of alimony per the Decree
of Divorce.
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, is the fact that
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari entirely ignores the Court of
-13-

Appeals' observation that Mr. Thronson had earned income at the
time of the divorce in the amount of $94,476 annually.
Presumably, Mr. Thronson accepts that finding as accurate.

That

being the case, the Petition for Rehearing absolutely ignores the
remarkable disparity in income between these parties. Ms.
Thronson7s experience over the past years has borne out this
Court's observation that, "She will face a substantial income
shortfall compared with her needs". (Court of Appeals' decision
pp. 5 5 - 5 6 )

This is in spite of the fact that even when paying

alimony, Mr. Thronson still had discretionary income above and
beyond that necessary to meet his monthly expenses.
In contrast to Mr. Thronson's "profile" standard for
determining alimony, which it arbitrarily ignores the cases which
do not fit the supposed "profile", the law in the state of Utah
is based upon fairness, equity and ascertainable standards which
are set forth above.

If the "profile" standard were adopted by

this court, not only would it absolutely ignore the standard
which has governed the award of alimony for many years, but it
would perpetuate the hardship of Ms. Thronson which has existed
since the termination of alimony under the divorce Decree.
CONCLUSION
The Petition fails to set forth any basis sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

In fact, no basis is identified in the body

of the Petition which could be relied upon to grant a Writ of
Certiorari in this case. The Court of Appeals has properly
-14-

Certiorari in this case. The Court of Appeals has properly
exercised its discretionary authority to modify a final Decree of
Divorce and award permanent alimony.

The decision of the Court

of Appeals is consistent with the request made various times by
Ms. Thronson for permanent alimony commencing with her Complaint
for Divorce.
The decision of the Court of Appeals, based upon the
findings of the trial court, meets the three-pronged test for
alimony which has long governed that issue in Utah. The
"profile" standard asserted in the Petition, if it ever was
viable, has not been relied upon in Utah for decades and should
not be a basis for re-examining the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The circumstances of these parties in particular Ms.
Thronson's inability to produce income to meet her needs acquired
during the marriage, and Mr. Thronson's ability to do so, justify
a permanent alimony award. Alimony was reasonable and warranted
on a temporary basis and there is no basis upon which to find
that those circumstances will change, therefore, a permanent
alimony award was in order.
DATED THIS QSj^-day

of July, 1991.
Respectfully Submitted,
GREEN & BERRY

V. \n)kd

'FREDERICK N. GREEN
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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OPINION
Cm of tht Court
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Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 890547-CA
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(March 25, 1991)

Charles H. Thronson,
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Attorneys:

Paul H. Liapis, Helen E. Christian, and Kim M.
Luhn, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Clark W. Sessions and Dean C. Andreasen, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Garff and Jackson.
JACKSON, Judge:
Mary Thronson appeals provisions of a divorce decree and
separate order awarding joint legal custody of a child, child
support, alimony, and property. We remand for further
proceedings regarding child custody and support. We modify the
alimony award and affirm the remainder of the decree.
FACTS
The parties were married on September 30, 1978. Their
marriage was the first for both. She was a full-time
pharmacist and he a full-time attorney. A son was born to them
on September 11, 1981. She became the child's primary
caretaker and a part-time pharmacist. He became a shareholder
in his law firm. She filed a complaint for divorce. He filed
a counterclaim for divorce. They were divorced by a decree
entered June 23, 1989. A separate order of joint legal custody
was also entered. Further relevant facts will be set forth
below in our treatment of the respective issues.

CHILD CUSTODY AWARD
Ms. Thronson challenges the joint legal custody decree and
order on two grounds: (1) She did not agree to the order of
joint legal custody and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 (1989)
required the agreement of both parents at the time of this
decree and order. (2) The provision for an automatic award of
sole custody to one parent when the other moves from the state
was error.
CHILD CUSTODY IN UTAH
Prior to 1988, Utah did not have a statute expressly
authorizing an award of "joint legal custody"1 of a child.

Our

1. Custody terminology: Many legislators, judges and writers
have been loose with their "joint" custody language. Early
articles identified this vexing problem as follows:
Both the forms of custody [sole, divided,
split, joint] following divorce and the terms
which describe them are vague and
overlapping. The lack of standard
definitions and the courts' tendency to use
certain terms interchangeably have created
confusion.
Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce,
12 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 523, 525 (1979).
Often, when referring to one of these custody
arrangements, courts use vague language or
inadequately defined terms.
Bratt, Joint Custody. 67 Ky. L.J. 271, 283 (1978-79).
One author points out that considerable semantic confusion
has resulted possibly because the "term" joint custody predates
the "concept* of joint custody as it is known today. He
states: "I have encountered at least fifteen terms used to
refer to various alternatives to sole custody: joint legal
custody, joint physical custody, divided custody, separate
custody, alternating custody, split custody, managing
conservatorship, possessory conservatorship, equal custody,
shared custody, partial custody, custody 'given to neither
party to the exclusion of the other,• temporary custody,
shifting custody, and concurrent custody." Miller, Jfljjlt
Custody, 13(3) Fam. L.Q. 345, 360 n. 79 (1979).
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divorce statutes have contained various child custodyprovisions since 1903. For many years Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
(1989) has authorized district courts to include in divorce
decrees "equitable orders relating to the children, property
and parties." Further, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 has contained
various specific provisions regarding factors to be considered
in awarding sole custody of a child. See Lembach v. Cox, 639
P.2d 197 (Utah 1981); 1 Utah L.Rev. 363 (1989) (historical
development of child custody factors and preferences in Utah).
"Joint Legal Custody" was specifically added to the sole
custody statute in 1988, and designated as § 30-3-10.1 to
-10.4. We emphasize that this is a joint "legal" custody
statute and not a joint "physical" custody statute. In the
1988 Utah legislative session, Senator Hillyard stated: "This
is not joint physical custody. The child obviously can't live
in two homes. But it's joint legal custody which would give
the non-custodial parent more involvement in the decisions of
child raising." Floor Debate, (Feb. 3, 1988) Sen. Recording
No. 42, side 2. In section 10.1 the legislature provided its
definition of joint legal custody:
In this chapter, "joint legal custody"
(1) means the sharing of the rights,
privileges, duties, and powers of a parent by
both parents, where specified;
(2) may include an award of exclusive
authority by the court to one parent to make
specific decisions;
(3) does not affect the physical custody
of the child except as specified in the order
of joint legal custody;
(4) is not based on awarding equal or
nearly equal periods of physical custody of
and access to the child to each of the
parents, as the best interest of the child
often requires that a primary physical
residence for the child be designated; and
(5) does not prohibit the court from
specifying one parent as the primary
caretaker and one home as the primary
residence of the child.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1 (1989). Subsections (1) and (2)
define joint legal custody: both parents share the authority
and responsibility to make basic decisions regarding their
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child's welfare. Subsections (3), (4) and (5) tell us what
joint legal custody is not — it is not joint physical
custody. We note that this statute does not contain a
definition of nor a provision for "joint physical custody."
Subsection 10.2(1) created a "rebuttable presumption" that
joint legal custody is in the best interest of a child. But,
that presumption was made subject to subsection (2) which
provided:
The court may order joint legal custody if it
determines that:
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint
legal custody;
(b) joint legal custody is in the best
interest of the child; and
(c) both parents appear capable of
implementing joint legal custody.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 (1989).
The order remains discretionary with the court, not
mandatory, even when all three conditions are satisfied, i.e.,
(1) parental agreement, (2) best interests, and (3) parents
capable of implementation. Further sections of the statute
emphasize its "parental agreement" posture. We note that
section 10.3 — terms of joint legal custody order — contains
two further subsections dealing with parental agreement:
(2) The court shall, where possible, include
in the order the terms agreed to between the
parties; . . .
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute
resolution procedure the parties agree to use
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989). Moreover, the termination
provisions, section 10.4, confer upon one parent the right to
unilaterally terminate the order of joint legal custody. The
order can be terminated simply by filing and serving a motion.
Once the motion is filed, the court is required to replace the
order "with an order of sole legal custody under Section
30-3-10.H Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 (1989). This provision
emphasizes the parental agreement stance of the statute as
initially adopted and in force at the time of this divorce.
We return to section 10.2(3) to point out that the
legislature created a list of factors the court sliali consider
in determining the best interest of a child in the context of
joint legal custody (not joint physical custody). Those
factors are:
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(a) whether the physical, psychological, and
emotional needs and development of the child
will benefit from joint legal custody;
(b) the ability of the parents to give first
priority to the welfare of the child and
reach shared decisions in the child's best
interest;
(c) whether each parent is capable of
encouraging and accepting a positive
relationship between the child and the other
parent;
(d) whether both parents participated in
raising the child before the filing of the
suit;
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes
of the parents;
(f) if the child is 12 years of age or older,
any preference of the child for or against
joint legal custody; and
(g) any other factors the court finds
relevant.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(3) (1989). On the other hand, the
legislature did not offer any guidance to trial courts to
assist in determining the "capability" of the parents. The
term is not defined. Section 10.4 contains provisions for (1)
modification of a joint legal custody order, (2) termination of
the order discussed above, and (3) attorneys fees based on
frivolous pleadings and harassment. Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-10.4 (1989). The modification provisions appear to be a
codification of the Hoaae v. Hoqqe. 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982)
bifurcated procedure used in sole custody modifications. Prior
to adoption of this statute in 1988, the only reported Utah
case dealing directly with an initial award of "joint custody"
was Lembach v. Cox, supra. There*, the court stated "a custody
arrangement, joint or otherwise, is within the broad equitable
powers of the court." Further, the court said "[t]he fact that
the father and the mother could not negotiate a joint custody
arrangement demonstrates the inappropriateness of ordering
joint custody." 639 P.2d at 200.2
2. Other Utah reported cases involving joint custody are:
Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507 (Utah 1985) (modification hearing
of an initial award of joint custody); Becker v. Becker, 694
P.2d 608 (Utah 1984) (on modification hearing, it was noted
that trial court considered joint custody but did not order it
in initial decree).
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Prior to 1980, a handful of states including California
had adopted various forms of "joint custody" statutes. During
the 1980's "joint custody" was in vogue and a second wave of
states adopted "joint custody" statutes. Utah became the
thirty-second state (and apparently the last) caught up in this

wave.

2 Family Law and Practice* § 32.04 (A. Rutkin ed. 1990 &

Supp.) (hereinafter "Fam. Law"). 3

California, the acknowledged pioneer of no-fault divorce
and joint custody, retrenched in 1988 regarding joint custody.
California's 1979 statute contained a "presumption . . . that
joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child where
the parents have agreed to an award of joint custody." Cal.
Civ. Code § 4600.5(a) (West 1979). In 1983, California amended
its joint custody statute to include a specific definition of
both "physical" custody and "legal" custody. The California
Legislature recognized the need to be more specific when in
1983 it defined joint legal custody to mean "both parents shall
share the right and responsibility to make decisions relating
to the health, education and welfare of the child," Cal. Civ.
Code § 4600.5(d), and defined joint physical custody as "each
of the parents . . . [have] significant periods of physical
custody." Cal. Civ. Code § 4600.5(d)(5) (West 1988). A team
3. The child custody reform of the eighties gained impetus
from ongoing no-fault divorce legislative reform. Utah added
"irreconcilable differences" to its list of nine fault-based
grounds in 1987. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(3)(a) (1987). "Both
reforms took place with no public commitment or private
initiative for the systematic assessment of the legal changes
on patterns of custody or on child welfare. As fashions change
and new interest groups emerge, family law is at risk of
becoming a series of experiments that never report results in
ways that can help inform the legislative process." Zimring,
Foreword to Sugarman & Kay, Divorce Reform at the Crossroads,
at viii (1990). As no-fault made divorce virtually automatic,
fathers* groups began to protest a pro-mother bias in child
custody decisions. At the same time, feminist groups began
attacking legal standards which were gender-specific as
inherently discriminatory. Then, fathers* groups turned the
idea of gender-neutrality to their advantage in the child
custody arena. These opposing forces set the stage for "joint
custody" statutes based on the rationale of "equality" rather
than "equity- and children end up taking a back seat to the
drivers, i.e., their divorcing parents. One writer succinctly
summed up the result: "This modern trend illustrates a move
backward toward the more explicit treatment of children as
property — only this time the property is to be divided
equally." Fineman, Dominant Discourse. Professional Language,
and Legal Change In Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 727, 739-40 (1988).
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of Stanford professionals proposed the need to consider "joint
custody" as having a third form — the actual residential
arrangement for the child.4 Later, a California Task Force
recommended that existing joint custody provisions be clarified
to indicate that no statutory presumption exists in favor of
joint custody. In response, subsection (d) was added:
This section establishes neither a
preference nor a presumption for or
against joint legal custody, joint
physical custody, or sole custody, but
allows the courts and the family the
widest discretion to choose a parenting
plan which is in the best interests of the
child or children.
Cal. Civ. Code § 4600(d) (West Supp. 1989).

Coincidentally, while this appeal was pending, the 1990
Utah Legislature substantially amended its two year-old joint
legal custody statute deleting the "rebuttable presumption"
favoring joint legal custody. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2
(1989 & Supp. 1990). However, the legislature retained its
initial definition of "joint legal custody," section 30-3-10.1,
and the list of seven factors courts are reguired to consider
in determining the best interests of the child in the context
of joint legal custody. Section 30-3-10.2(3)(a-g). Also
retained in the statute is some language regarding parental
agreement: "The court shall, where possible, include in the
order [joint legal custody order] the terms agreed to between
the parties [parents]," § 30-3-10.3(2) (emphasis added), and,
"The agreement may contain a dispute resolution procedure the
parties agree to use . . . ." § 30-3-10.3(5) (emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989)._ Our legislature's change of
position on the "rebuttable presumption" in favor of joint
legal custody and the
4. "There are actually three aspects of joint custody: the
legal custody agreement, the physical custody agreement and the
actual residential arrangement for the child. It is important
to investigate the three forms of joint custody separately to
understand the implications of each for the functioning of the
post-divorce family." Albiston, Maccoby, & Mnookin, Does Joint
Legal Custody Matter?. Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 167, 168 (1990).
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necessity of parental agreement creates confusion concerning
the public policy basis for the joint legal custody statute.
Utah and California appear to be the first and only states to
retrench from a presumption in favor of joint (legal) custody
after having adopted the presumption. Due to the paucity of
pre-statute and absence of post-statute joint custody reported
decisions in Utah, plus the fact that Utah's statute is not
like that of any other state, we are left to decide an issue of
first impression with little useful precedent. Ms. Thronson
argues that we should apply the 1990 version of the joint legal
custody statute, i.e., apply the amendments retroactively. We
decline to do so. The 1990 amendments did not make a mere
procedural change or simply clarify how the 1988 statute should
have been understood originally. The amendments were
substantial and substantive, thus retroactive application is
not appropriate. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1369 n. 4
(Utah 1982).
ANALYSIS OF JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY AWARD
UNDER § 30-3-10.1 to -10.4
As noted above, the majority of states have adopted
statutes expressly authorizing some form of "joint custody"
award. Those statutes come in four basic forms:
1. joint custody as an option only where
the parties petition or agree;
2.

joint custody as an option;

3. joint custody as a presumption or
preference;
4. joint custody split into joint legal
custody and joint physical custody.
Fam. Law. § 32.06[2]. Initially, Utah combined forms 1 and 3.
Now, Utah is form 2, but only as to joint "legal" custody.
Here, the trial court faced Utah's initial statute with a
favorable presumption on one hand and the requirement of
parents' agreement on the other. Ms. Thronson opposed a joint
custody order. The trial court failed to meet the parental
agreement requirement head-on. Instead, the court found "there
exists substantial difficulty between the parties" and "it is
in the best interests of the child for the parties to be
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awarded joint legal custody." The court failed to find whether
the parents agreed or disagreed as to an order of joint legal
custody* At the time the court ruled, the statute stated:
The court may order joint legal custody if
it determines that:
(a) both parents agree to an order of
joint legal custody . . .
§ 30-3-10.2(2)(a) (1989).
The form of the statute required a threshold finding of
parental "agreement." The trial court implicitly found
"disagreement" but proceeded with the order. Moreover, the
record reveals opposition to the order, i.e., no agreement.
Several states have adopted the "parental agreement" form of
joint custody statute, including Colorado, Texas and Kansas.
The Colorado statute, for example, requires that any motion for
joint custody be filed by both parties, Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 14-10-124(5) (1973), and that any plan for joint custody must
be jointly agreed to by the parties, Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 14-10-124.5(5) (1973). In Colorado, a trial court ordered
joint custody over the objection of the mother. The appellate
court ruled that the award in the absence of agreement of the
parties was an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of
Posinoff, 683 P.2d 377, 378 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). S££ alSft
Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 672 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)(court
has no authority to award joint custody without agreement);
Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Kan. App. 2d 284, 615 P.2d 806
(1980)(without agreement, joint custody award unauthorized).
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing the order of joint legal custody on the parents and
child. The statute required parental agreement. Here, there
was parental opposition. See Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 200
(Utah 1981)(inappropriate to order: joint custody where parents
not in agreement). Thus, we vacate the order of joint legal
custody. Due to our ruling and remand, we need not reach Ms.
Thronson's challenge to the provision for automatic change of
custody when one parent moves from the state.

5. Illinois, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Wisconsin have also
adopted similar statutes. Fam. Law § 32.06[2] at n. 45.

890547-CA

9

ANALYSIS OF CHILD CUSTODY
UNDER § 30-3-10
Our vacating of the order of joint legal custody is not
necessarily dispositive of the issues of child custody,
including legal custody, i.e., decision-making, and physical
custody, i.e., caregiving and visitation rights. The trial
court's findings might support a "best interests" custody award
under § 30-3-10, although an award of joint legal custody was
improper. However, both the court's memorandum decision and
formal findings specify the court's reliance on the
legislature's list of best interest factors in the joint legal
custody statute § 30-3-10.2(3) enumerated above. On the other
hand, § 30-3-10 provides:
In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child and
the past conduct and demonstrated moral
standards of each of the parties.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1989) (emphasis added).
Our Supreme Court has developed the best interest factors
to be considered under this provision.
We believe that the choice in competing
child custody claims should instead be based
on function-related factors. Prominent among
these, though not exclusive, is the identity
of the primary caretaker during the
marriage. Other factors should include the
identity of the parent with greater
flexibility to provide personal care for the
child and the identity of the parent with
whom the child has spent most of his or her
time pending custody determination if that
period has been lengthy. Another important
factor should be the stability of the
environment provided by each parent.
Pusev v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986)
added). See also Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649
1982); Rule 4-903(3) Utah Code of Jud. Admin.
custody evaluators to consider and respond to
factors).
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(emphasis
P.2d 38, 41 (Utah
(1989) (requiring
a list of

Our comparison of the two lists of factors reveals that
they are not identical, although some similarities appear.
Moreover, the context of the respective factors point the
thrust of the trial court's inquiry in two different
directions. As a result, the findings herein will not support
an ultimate finding under § 30-3-10 that child custody should
be placed with one parent or the other. Further, the findings
contain internal disagreement. The memorandum decision states
"the court desires the parties to arrange between themselves
for reasonable and liberal visitation which they determine."
To the same effect is formal finding number 61: "[i]t is in
the best interests of the parties and their minor child to
attempt to arrange between themselves reasonable and liberal
visitation . . . .
If the parties are unable to do so, the
court will set a specific schedule." But, the court in formal
finding number 65 took that promised privilege away from the
parties stating — "[i]n light of an appropriate reasonable and
liberal visitation schedule, it is reasonable that the parties'
minor child will spend 57% of his time with plaintiff, who has
primary physical custody, and 43% of his time with the
defendant.
The 57% visitation award to the mother provides
the basis for the "primary physical custody" statement. This
was the only time the trial court mentioned physical custody.
This specification of visitation time surreptitiously imposed
an award of joint physical custody upon the parties without
proper consideration of the best interest factors under
§ 30-3-10. We hold the findings to be inadequate to support
any award of child custody because:
(1) The trial court utilized best interest
factors related to joint legal custody
§ 30-3-10.2(3) and not the factors related to
child custody § 30-3-10;
(2) The findings are in conflict as to the
determination of visitation rights, i.e., by
the court or the parents;
(3) The findings do not support any award of
physical custody; and
(4) Custody was awarded on the basis of a
court imposed visitation time allocation.
Our task is to act in the best interests of the child. We
must vacate and remand the custody and visitation award. We do
not remand simply for revision of the findings or with
directions to modify the decree regarding these matters.
During the interim, the facts regarding the parents and their
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child and their relationships might have been dramatically
changed. Further, the joint legal custody statute has been
substantially amended. The current factual and legal
circumstances should be examined before this matter is
finalized. Thus, we remand for further fact finding and a new
legal determination, utilizing whatever procedures and hearings
the trial court deems necessary — consistent with this opinion.
CHILD SUPPORT AWARD
Child support will have to be reconsidered in connection
with the above remand. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.4 (Supp. 1990)
reveals that the support obligation is intended to be a shared
obligation of both parents. This obligation must be allocated
in proportion to the parties' adjusted gross income pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 to -7.7. Subsection 7.5 lists the
items of income to be included in gross income. It also lists
two items to be subtracted from gross income to calculate
adjusted gross income: alimony previously ordered and paid and
child support previously ordered. Neither of those items is
applicable here. Thus, gross income is the same as adjusted
gross income in this case. But, the trial court failed to
include income from nonearned sources as required by
§ 78-45-7.5(1)(a). Moreover, the trial court averaged Mr.
Thronson's earned income for several years rather than using
"current earnings." Section 78-45-7.5(5)(b) indicates that
current earnings are to be used. On remand, child support
calculations should properly account for these items pursuant
to the statutory requirements.
ALIMONY AWARD
The trial court awarded Ms. Thronson alimony of $800 per
month for one year. Three factors must be considered by the
trial court in making an alimony award:
1. the financial condition and needs of the
party seeking alimony;
2. that party's ability to produce
sufficient income for him or herself; and
3. the ability of the other party to provide
support.
Naranio v. Naranio. 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(citing English v. English. 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977)).
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"Failure to analyze the parties' circumstances in light of
these three factors constitutes an abuse of discretion." Ifl.
(citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986)). As
long as the trial court exercises its discretion within the
bounds and under the standards we have set and has supported
its decision with adequate findings and conclusions, we will
not disturb its rulings. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649
(Utah 1988) .
Here, the trial court considered each of the alimony
factors and entered findings. Ms. Thronson's actual and
necessary monthly living expenses were found to be $3,700. She
presented a higher figure, but the court heard evidence
challenging certain items and found them to be overstated. Ms.
Thronson's current earning capacity, as a full-time pharmacist,
was found to be $35,000 a year gross. This finding was based
on competent evidence and represents the midpoint of an annual
gross salary range of $31,000 to $39,000. The final factor,
Mr. Thronson's ability to provide support, i.e., his earning
capacity, was considered by the trial court. He submitted a
thirteen year summary of his income. The trial court used an
average of the last eight years, after excluding some
contingent fee income in three of those years. Thus, the court
found Mr. Thronson's average gross income to be $71,376
annually. This calculation and finding was in error. Mr.
Thronson's schedule showed his current gross earning capacity
to be $94,476 annually. Nevertheless, we cannot say that an
award of $800 per month in alimony is an abuse of discretion*
given the above factors and other financial circumstances of
the parties. But, we do hold that the trial court abused its
discretion in making the alimony non-permanent, i.e., for one
year.
The trial court found that "an annual income of $35,000
should be imputed" to Ms. Thronson, i.e., she could earn that
amount, assuming she was employed on a full-time basis. But,
the court found her needs to be $3., 700 per month, i.e., $44,400
annually. Accordingly, she is not capable of meeting her
needs, she requires $9,400 annually to meet her needs, even
when employed on a full-time basis.
Thus, she will require
the $800 per month ($9,600 annually) alimony for the forseeable
future. Otherwise, she will face a substantial income
shortfall compared to her needs. Further, the trial court
found Mr. Thronson's actual and necessary monthly living
expenses to be $4,300 per month, i.e., $51,600 annually. This
leaves him with some discretionary income. These findings
warrant an award of permanent alimony. The trial court abused
its discretion in limiting the alimony award to one year.
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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We remand for modification of the alimony award to be permanent
alimony of $800 per month.
OTHER FINANCIAL AND
PROPERTY AWARDS
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a
division of property in a divorce action. The trial court has
considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property
interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of
validity. See Naranio, 751 P.2d at 1146. Ms. Thronson claims
the trial court erred by failing to restore to her inheritance
monies expended by her while the parties were separated prior
to divorce; by failing to replace certain furniture removed by
Mr. Thronson; and by failing to restore certain funds spent by
Mr. Thronson after they separated. We have examined these
items and find no abuse of trial court discretion. This court
will not disturb a determination of financial and property
interests unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of
discretion. Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1335. Thus, we affirm the
rulings on these matte*^. ^
4C-

Norman H. Jackson,^cfudge

WE CONCUR:

ft

890547-CA

"J v?*

'

14

Tab 2

MARY C. CORPORDN #734
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORDN & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

MARY THRONSON,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE

-vs-

Civil No. D87-

CHARLES THRONSON,

Judge

Defendant.

COMES

NOW

THE

PLAINTIFF

to

the above-entitled action, by and through

counsel, and complains and alleges against the defendant as follows:
1.
Utah

Plaintiff

tor

is and has been a resident of Salt Lake County, State of

a period of three months or more immediately prior to the filing of

the Complaint m this action,
2.

The parties to this action are husband and wife, having been married

on September 30, 1978 in Omaha, Nebraska,
3.

Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties which make

continuation of the marriage impossible,
4.
State

The

parties maintained their marital domicile in Salt Lake County,

ot Utah and the acts complained ot herein occurred m Sale Lake County,

State or Utah.
5.

There

has

been

one child b o m as issue of this marriage, namely,

Patrick,
awarded

b o m September 11 , 1981 • Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be
the

temporary

and permanent care, custody and control of said minor

child, subject to defendant's reasonable rights of visitation*
6.

Defendant

Thousand

Dollars

should

be

($6,000.00)

ordered
per

to

month,

pay to plaintiff the sum of Six
as and for child support, for the

support and maintenance of the minor child children of the parties, until said
child

attains

the

age

of 18 years or graduates from high school, whichever

last occurs*
7.
support

If

the

defendant

obligation,

withholding

the

relief,

falls

plaintiff

30

or more days in arrears in his child

should

be

entitled to mandatory income

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45(d)-1 , _et.

jseq. (1984, as amended).
8.
and
said

Defendant should be ordered to maintain in force health and accident

dental insurance for the benefit of the minor child of the parties, until
minor

whichever
medical,

child
last

attains the age of 18 years or graduates from high school,

occurs.

Each party should be ordered to pay one-half of all

dental, orthodontic,

optometric and psychotherapeutic expenses not

covered by said insurance.
9.
insurance
beneficiary

Defendant
on

his
of

should
own

said

be

ordered

to maintain

in

force a policy of

life, naming the minor child as the sole and absolute
life insurance policy, in the minimum face value of One

Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000,00) , until said child reaches the age of 18
years or graduates from high school, whichever last occurs.
10.

Defendant

should

be

ordered

to pay to plaintiff the sum of Two

Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) per month, as and for alimony, until the death or
the

plaintiff,

the death of the defendant, or the remarriage or cohabitation

of the plaintiff, whichever first occurs.
2

11.

Defendant should be required to maintain plaintiff as a beneficiary

on his health insurance policy for the maximum time allowable by law after the
entry

of

payment

the
of

Decree of Divorce herein, with defendant to be responsible for

the

preniums

for

said health insurance, in lieu of an award of

additional alimony to the plaintiff.
12.

Defendant

the

parties

as

a

and

federal

income

should be awarded the right to claim the minor child of
dependent for the purpose of the calculation of his state
taxes, so

long

as

he is current in his child support

obligation for any tax year in which the minor child is so claimed.
should

be

required

to

sign

Plaintiff

all documents necessary to enable defendant to

claim the minor child in such a manner.
13.

During

interest
City,

in

real

Utah

the course of their marriage, the parties have acquired an
property

commonly known as 2063 Hubbard Avenue, Salt Lake

84108. Plaintiff should be awarded the temporary and permanent

use and possession of said real property, subject to the indebtedness thereon,
which

plaintiff should be ordered to pay and assume, and subject to a lien in

behalf
the

of

date

the

defendant for one-half the equity value in the property as of

of filing of the Complaint for Divorce, which should become payable

to defendant upon the first to occur of the following events:
a.

plaintiff* s

remarriage or cohabitation in the home with a man

other than the defendant;
b.

the minor child of the parties achieving the age of 18 years or

graduating from high school, whichever last occurs;
c.

the death of the plaintiff;

d.

the sale of the real property at plaintiff's election;

e.

plaintiff's

ceasing

to use said real property as her primary

place or residence.
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14.

During

the

course

of

their marriage, the parties have acquired

certain automobiles, including a 1986 Mercedes 190, a 1986 Toyota Landcruiser,
three

motorcycles

Mercedes

and

automobile,

Defendant

should

be

a

utility

free

and

trailer.

clear

of

Plaintiff should be awarded the

any

interest

of

the defendant.

awarded the Toyota Landcruiser, the motorcycles and the

utility trailer, free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff.
15.

During the course of their marriage, the defendant has acquired an

interest

in

a

gun collection which should be awarded to the defendant, free

and clear of any interest of the plaintiff.
16.

During

certain

items

of

the

course • of

personal

their marriage, the parties have acquired

effects, jewelry, clothing and belongings. Each

party should be awarded his or her own personal items.
17.

During

certain
should

items
be

the

course

of

their marriage, the parties have acquired

of household furnishings, fixtures and appliances, which items

awarded

to

the

plaintiff, free and clear of any interest of the

defendant.
18.
interest

During the course of their marriage, the defendant has acquired an
in

a

retirement

plan through his employer which should be divided

equally between the parties according to the "Woodward" formula,
19.

During

the course of their marriage, the parties have acquired an

interest in certain banking accounts, which accounts should be diviced equally
between the parties according to monetary value.
20.

During

interest
member

in
of

the

course

of their marriage, each party has acquired an

an inheritance or insurance proceeds by reason of the death of a
his

or

her

family.

Specifically,

plaintiff

has acquired an

inheritance

by reason of the death of her brother. Defendant has acquired an

inheritance

by

reason

ot

the

death of his grandmother.
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Each parr; should

receive his or her own separate inheritance, free and clear of any interest of
the other party, since these inheritances are not marital assets.
21.

During

further
to

the

interest

plaintiff,

limited

course

of their marriage, the defendant has acquired

in assets, the exact nature and extent of which are unknown

which

partnership.

include,

but

which

are not limited to, interest in a

These remaining assets of the parties should be divided

equally between the parties according to monetary value, one-half to each.
22.

Plaintiff

parties
on

unaware of any debts or obligations incurred by the

which are presently outstanding, other than the mortgage indebtedness

the real property.

defendant
should
be

is

In the event that any such debts or obligations exist,

should be ordered to pay and assume these debts and obligations and

be

ordered to hold the plaintiff harmless thereon.

Each party should

ordered to pay and assume all debts and obligations incurred in his or her

own name since the date of filing of the Complaint for Divorce in this action,
and each should be ordered to hold the other harmless thereon.
23.

Each

documents

to

party should be ordered to execute and deliver all necessary

transfer the title and ownership of the property of the parties

pursuant to the Decree entered in this action.
24.
costs

Each party should be ordered to pay and assume his or her own court

and

attorney's

uncontested.
ordered

to

In
pay

the

fees
event

incurred

herein

in

the

event

this matter is

this matter is contested, defendant should be

plaintiff1s reasonable court costs and attorney's fees in an

amount to be determined by the court.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for the following relief:
1.
between

For
the

a Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony existing
parties, the same to become final and effective innediately upon

Che signing and entry thereof by the court.
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2.

For said Decree to be granted in accordance with the Complaint of the

plaintiff,
3.

as set forth above.
For such other and further relief as to the court may seem just and

proper,
DATED THIS ^

day of _ ^ j ? J ^ f ^ j ^ £ l

, 1987.

CORFORON & WILLIAMS

MARY C, ^RPORDBK^^
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's address:
2063 Hubbard Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
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